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Back from Beyond the Bid-Ask Spread: 






Research on the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the improved 
availability of data. Researchers have addressed questions regarding the factors 
that influence bid-ask spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, 
return and liquidity. Intra-day data have been used to measure the effective spread 
and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the 
price impact of transactions on a trade-by-trade analysis.  
 
The growth in the creation of tax-transparent securities has greatly enhanced the 
visibility of securitized real estate, and has naturally led to the question of whether 
the increased visibility of real estate has caused market liquidity to change. 
Although the growth in the public market for securitized real estate has occurred in 
international markets, it has not been accompanied by universal publication of 
transaction data. Therefore this paper develops an aggregate daily data-based test 
for liquidity and applies the test to US data in order to check for consistency with 
the results of prior intra-day analysis. If the two approaches produce similar results, 
we can apply the same technique to markets in which less detailed data are 
available and offer conclusions on the liquidity of a wider set of markets.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The development of international stock markets has produced an increasing 
number of innovations in investment vehicles. In particular, tax-transparent 
securities for real estate investment have been introduced in a number of stock 
markets. The arguments for their introduction include enhancing allocative 
efficiency. However, experience in the US suggests that the development of such 
vehicles (in particular Real Estate Investment Trusts, i.e. REITs) has also 
increased liquidity and has therefore contributed to an improved operational 
efficiency in real estate markets. The availability of trade-by-trade data in the US 
has facilitated research into the liquidity of trading in REITs but such data are not 
universally available and it may therefore not be possible to replicate the US 
research in international markets.  
 
This paper seeks to establish the extent to which the primary results of Clayton and 
MacKinnon (2000) obtained using intra-day data can be replicated with daily 
returns. By employing less-finely defined data some information is lost. However, 
the loss is compensated by the ability to investigate longer periods of time and to 
address other relevant factors including the separation of size and market 
influences on liquidity. 
 
We use daily US data over the period 1993 to 2005; a sample period which 
includes the two years covered by Clayton and MacKinnon (1993 and 1996). An 
estimating equation based on daily data is derived and then applied to each year 
within the sample period. Because of the extended period used in this study, we 
are able to quantify changes in market liquidity over time and also to distinguish 
between the effect of company size and market. Having shown that our results are 
consistent with the findings of Clayton and MacKinnon we also examine the UK 
and Australian markets during the same sample period. The UK was chosen 
because it had a well developed securities market in property companies prior to 
the introduction of a REIT vehicle in 2007. Australia was chosen because it was   3
the first international market (following the US) to introduce tax-transparent real 
estate vehicles (Listed Property Trusts) in 1971. 
 
 
2. Previous Research 
 
Liquidity has been extensively studied in equity markets. It can be argued that 
liquidity influences expected returns, either because investors might be prepared to 
pay a premium for liquid stocks when the market is down (Chordia et al., 2000, 
2001) or because, investors might perceive liquidity as a source of additional 
returns in different phases of markets (Acharya and Pedersen  2005 and Amihud, 
2002). 
 
The connection between liquidity and the magnitude of the bid-ask spread is 
similarly well established; the larger the spread, the more expensive is trading in 
the stock. This, in turn, implies that investors would be inhibited in exploiting 
perceived mis-pricing or in making minor adjustments to their portfolio position, 
resulting in less trading and less liquidity.  The connection between liquidity and the 
bid-ask spread in other stock markets has been demonstrated by Boothe (1988) 
and Gwilym, Clare and Thomas (1998)
4.  
 
However, the size of the bid-ask spread is but one component of liquidity; Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1996) argue that the spread only accounts for inventory 
costs, which are thought to be relatively minor compared with other costs of market 
making. For example, a market lacking depth would result in prices moving away 
from investors seeking to trade in larger quantities as market makers adjusted their 
bid-ask prices, even though the spread might remain unchanged (Kyle, 1985). 
Investors would therefore become aware that trading would be difficult in any large 
quantities in markets that lacked depth and might require a risk premium to 
                                                 
4 See also Capozza et al. (2004), Kluger and Miller (1990) and Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) for 
research into real estate and other markets.   4
compensate for this source of risk. In this framework, the bid-ask spread reflects 
the “tightness” aspect, i.e. the spread is only giving some indication of the costs in 
a short-term round trip transaction. Studies of the bid-ask spread have therefore 
assumed away the substantial minority of transactions that have taken place either 
within the spread or, perhaps for large trades, outside the quoted spread. 
 
 
3. Derivation of Research Model 
 
In assessing the behavior of stock-liquidity, Clayton and MacKinnon (2000) 
(hereafter C&M) concentrate their analysis on the change in stock price associated 
with the size of trade. This was a powerful approach to the problem, enabled by the 
researchers’ access to trade-by-trade data. We start by applying the C&M model to 
aggregate daily price changes rather than to intra-day price changes. 
 
The C&M model assumes a linear relationship between the change of price 
between two successive trades and (a) the volume of shares traded and (b) the 
difference between the direction of successive trades (Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996). This latter variable reflects the effective spread – if 
successive trades are in the same direction (e.g. retail buyer initiated), the 
computed difference would be zero. However, if the directions were different the 
variable would be either +2 or -2. The price change would therefore reflect (half) 
the effective price change between the market maker’s bid and offer prices. On the 
question of volume, their model implies that a large buy order would shift market 
makers’ prices upwards while small orders would have less effect.  
 
Algebraically the price change relationship on a trade-by-trade basis is represented 
by  
 
t t t t t t t I I Q I P P ε φ λ + − + = − − − ) ( 1 1             (1) 
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Where :    λ = market depth or inverse liquidity parameter 
   φ = the effective cost of the transaction 
   Qt = the volume of stock traded, and 
   It = Direction Indicator where: 
               It = 1 for retail investor’s initiated buy and 
               It = -1 for retail investor’s initiated sell transaction. 
 
In this formulation, the lower the impact of large trades, the more liquid is the 
market. Thus over time, if the market were to become more liquid and deeper, it 
would be reflected in a smaller estimatedλ. C&M found that, for their REIT samples 
in 1993 and 1996, the market was more liquid in 1996 than in 1993. However as 
shown in equation (1), they were also testing for the effective bid-ask spread by the 
φ parameter. On the whole, they were unable to find evidence that the φ parameter 
changed significantly between 1993 and 1996. C&M also found that changes in 
liquidity were most obvious in REITs that were, or became, self advised and self 
managed.  
 
C&M concluded that their study had demonstrated the value of intra-day data and 
their results advanced the study of liquidity assessment significantly. However, 
what remains unknown is whether their results derive entirely from the use of the 
intra-day data or whether the changes in liquidity they document would have been 
revealed with the aggregated daily data that might be more widely available in 
other international markets). 
 
In our sample we are using daily returns and daily transaction volume, therefore a 
natural question is to ask what would happen if we were to take the aggregate of 
daily trades using the above formulation. Summing equation (1) over the number of 
trades per day we derive equation (2): 
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The LHS of equation (2) equals the price change (or return) over the day. The first 
variable on the RHS sums to the total net transactions in the day and the second 
term represents the sum of transactions indicators. Since every transaction apart 
from the first and last appears twice with the opposite sign, all intermediate 
transaction indicators cancel except for the first and last. In the absence of new 
information, the expected daily price change would arise from trade changing 
direction; that is, the opening trade taking place at the bid (ask) price and the 
closing trade taking place at the ask (bid) price .   
 









φ λ      (3) 
 
which reflects the argument that φ  is the estimated parameter for the difference 
between the trades that occur between open and close. The λ term indicates the 
effect of trading volumes on price movements during the course of the day. 
 
To distinguish between market liquidity in response to net sales and purchases we 
create dummy variables to capture positive and negative price movements which 
will allow asymmetrical responses to changes in market direction. In addition, since 
we are using price indices, the absolute changes in prices are replaced by relative 
price changes in the form of log returns
5. Our estimated regression therefore takes 
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5 We also obtained results using price changes and they were not materially different from the ones 
obtained using log returns and presented here.   7
where Dup and Ddown are dummy variables that reflect whether the market price 
has risen or fallen during the day. In this model, market-wide information that is not 
accompanied by systematic trading is captured in the constant α0 and the residual 
error terms t ε . The sum of the estimated α coefficients therefore reflects the 
effective spread for small transactions and corresponds to the  ( ) open close I I − φ  term in 
equation (3). The estimated λ terms reflect the sensitivity of the market to 
increases in volume. Note that the estimated λ coefficients indicate market depth 
because a “deep” market (lowλ) would be characterized by the ability to absorb 
large volumes of trading without excessive price movements. Note also that the 
first intercept term is not redundant because it reflects the returns on days in which 
no trade takes place.  
  
In terms of simple market economics, we can envisage a highly elastic demand 
curve for stock at the current price, some of which is provided by the market maker 
but the bulk of which is provided by other investors. If the market lacks depth, 
investors wishing to trade may find that the price has to move more to encourage 
buyers or sellers to enter the market. Thus, they will face a downward sloping 
demand curve if they wish to sell and an upward sloping supply curve if they wish 
to buy. This suggests that additional depth in the market may allow investors to 
trade without the market price changing. In contrast, information flows may result in 
price changes without significant trading. We distinguish between upward and 
downward price movements because of evidence in many markets that liquidity is 
asymmetrical (see Madhaven and Sofianos, 1998 and Chung et al., 1999). In 
particular, Escribano and Pascual (2005) show that for the NYSE, the adjustment 
to trading is not symmetrical but that increased volatility in stock price returns tends 
to lead to greater symmetry in the bid-ask spread. 
 
The upward and downward price changes are given respectively by equations (5) 
and (6) 
( ) t t t Q Dup Dup r ε λ λ α α + + + + = ∑ 1 0 1 0            (5)   8
( ) t t t Q Ddown Ddown r ε λ λ α α + + + + = ∑ 2 0 2 0                 (6) 
 
 
The estimated slopes (λi) represent the market depth; the smaller the absolute 
slope, the more liquid is the market and the more stock the market can absorb or 
supply at a price that does not differ much from the current price. The intercept 
terms (αi) provide some insight into the transaction costs in the market since the 
sum of the absolute values of the α shows the minimum difference between buy 
and sell orders (see Figure 1). It thus corresponds to the estimate by C&M of the 
effective spreads cost and we hereafter use the symbol α to refer to the sum of the 
absolute values of the intercepts. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
 
4. US Data 
 
Daily price changes, trading volumes and the market membership of 184 US 
REITs were obtained from SNL Financials. Bid and ask prices were obtained from 
Reuters for a smaller sample of US REITs which we use only for comparative 
purposes. 
 
The bid-ask spread for REIT i at time t is calculated as follows: 
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where PBi,t and PAi,t respectively represent the bid and ask price for company i at 
time t. 
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Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for price changes and trading volumes and 
shows a fairly consistent growth in numbers of REITs and the trading volume. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
 
Throughout the period of study (1993-2005) new REITs were being introduced into 
the market. Since we were running regressions for each calendar year, we added 
new companies to the data set only when there were at least 60 data points for the 
year of entry in order to provide reasonably robust parameter estimates. We report 
annual average estimates of coefficients, along with the R
2 of the regression and 
the number of REITs available in that particular year. If all REITs have a full time 
series for all variables, the maximum number of regressions would be 2,392 for the 
overall sample (184 REITs * 13 years). Since all 184 REITs are not part of the 
sample for the entire period, we are able to run only 1,618 regressions. For each 
year the available number of estimated equations is reported in the last column of 
Table 2. This column can be compared with the last column of Table 1, which 
contains the total number of REITs existing in our sample for each year. 
 
 
5. Observations and Hypotheses 
 
US real estate sector returns are illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the 
performance of our sample of REITS, relative to the overall equity market. As can 
be seen, REITs underperformed the S&P 500 from 1995 until early 2000, when 
REITs were resilient in the face of a fall in the equity market which lasted through 
2002. Thereafter, REITs performed similarly to the rest of the equity market until 
the end of 2005. 
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ] 
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In Figure 3 we show reported spreads for REITs from 1991 onwards. Note that 
spreads peaked in 1993. This result is consistent with the finding of C&M that 
liquidity increased between 1993 and 1996. In fact, the change appears to have 
taken place early in that interval because reported spreads fell sharply in 1994.  
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ] 
 
Previous research has concluded that, after a rise at the end of the 1980s, spreads 
fell in the 1990s (Nelling et al., 1995). However, it has also been shown that 
average REITs spreads fell from 1993 to 1996, not because there was a general 
reduction in REIT spreads, but because new REITs appeared that were more liquid 
than the existing REITs (see Cole, 1998).  
 
From the previous work and from the above discussion we therefore would expect 
to observe the following: 
 
Market Depth (λ) from 1993 onward: The estimated slopes on the positive return 
days should be positive; the slopes on negative return days should be negative. 
The slopes should become flatter (reflecting increasing market depth and improved 
liquidity) from 1993 to 1996 and later as the REIT market continued to develop and 
expand.  
 
Estimated Spreads (α) from 1993 onward: The estimated intercepts on positive 
(negative) return days should be positive (negative). The estimated (half) spreads 
should also decrease over time, signaling an improvement in liquidity. 
 
New vs. Old REITs: There should be more liquidity for the new REITs introduced 
in the post-1993 market. 
   11
NYSE vs. other markets: The NYSE should be more liquid than the other markets 
(ASE and NASDAQ
6). In exploring this question, we have to deal with the 
complication that large cap REITs would be expected to be more liquid than small 
cap REITs and that the market effect might therefore be confused with a size 
effect. We therefore include in our analysis some further exploration of the size vs. 
market effects. Ideally, we would like to test whether the NASDAQ effects were 
different from the other markets but the sample of NASDAQ stocks was 
insufficiently large to make meaningful comparisons
7. 
 
Effective spreads (α) and reported spreads: The estimates of effective spreads, 
represented by the sum of the absolute values of the intercepts, from equation (4), 




6. Regression Results 
 
Before reporting the regression results, we first consider alternative interpretations 
of the regressions. For example, although we are regressing returns on volume, it 
might be thought that the direction of influence runs from returns to volume. In 
support of our interpretation, Clark (1973), Karpoff (1987), Tauchen and Pitts 
(1983) argue that trading volume proxies for the flow of new information and the 
level of disagreement between traders (which we identify with market depth).  For 
an interesting extension of their work, see Rodgers et al. (2001).  
 
Notwithstanding the thrust of previous research, as a precautionary step we first 
conduct Granger causality tests on individual stock returns and trading volume. 
                                                 
6 For evidence see Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997); Chan and Lakonishok (1997); Huang and 
Stoll (1996). 
7 There is another complication with NASDAQ trades in that they may be reported as being two 
trades if the dealer buys and sells to retail investors. In analysing the effect of volume, this would 
imply that NASDAQ might seem more liquid than the other markets, but the results would be even 
more pronounced if the NASDAQ volumes were deflated. So our conclusions would not be affected, 
NYSE does provide more liquidity. 
8 Glosten and Harris (1998); Lin et al. (1995), Holthausen,  Leftwich  and Mayers  (1987)   12
The results showed little of significance. Of the 2,762 Granger regression tests, 
12.9 percent suggested that daily volume Granger-caused daily returns, while 9.7 
percent suggested that daily returns Granger-caused daily volume (at the 95 
percent confidence level). Only in 1995, did we find more instances of returns 
Granger-causing volume (14.8 percent) than volume causing returns (11.5 
percent). The Granger-causality results suggest that this was not a dominant issue 
that affected stock prices in the sample used in this study.  
 
Market Spreads and Market Depth 1993 onward 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results of estimating the regression shown in equation (4) 
for each year from 1993 to 2005 for our sample of US REITs. Note that over time 
the intercepts (α) move closer to each other, implying declining spreads in the 
market over the period.  For both positive and negative intercepts the sharpest 
reduction is from 1993 to 1994, which is consistent with the findings of C&M.  For 
the market depth coefficients (λ) both of the slopes become flatter over the sample 
period signifying improving market depth.  There is some asymmetry in the slopes; 
the positive slope is generally greater in absolute terms than the negative slope. 
This implies that retail investors’ buying pressure causes more price movement 
than retail investors’ selling pressure. The only two exceptions occur in 2002 and 
2004 and by then both upward and downward price sensitivity has declined by 
more than 50% compared with their values in the 1990s. The slope asymmetry 
therefore tends to disappear when the market depth improves. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Although there is substantial variation among the regression results for each 
company, the strength of the regressions is clearly indicated by the average 
adjusted R
2 for the regressions, which are all larger than 55 percent. The daily data 
are noisy and we would not expect the regressions to explain variation in returns 
very strongly. We calculated the proportion of significant estimates for this   13
regression and show the results in Table 3. It is interesting to note that in the early 
part of the sample period, the results were strongly significant in the majority of 
cases. As time progressed, however, the slopes of the regressions decreased and 
thus it is not surprising that the proportion of significant parameters also declined.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
 
New vs. Old REITs 
 
The next issue we examine is the relative liquidity of the new and old REITs. We 
first divided our sample into the REITs that existed before 1993 and those that 
have appeared since that year. We then estimated equation (4) for both samples. 
The results are reported in the form of differences in intercepts and slopes for new 
and old REITs. In Table 4, the positive intercepts for new REITs are almost always 
lower than for older REITs (except in two years when they are equal). In contrast, 
the negative intercepts are always lower in absolute terms for new REITs, implying 
smaller effective spreads for new REITs. The slopes of new REITS are also 
consistently smaller in absolute terms than for old REITs suggesting that the 
market is deeper for newer REITs. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Furthermore, consistent with prior research, we noted that older REITs have shown 
more variation in liquidity over the sample period. In contrast, new REITs are more 
liquid and less affected by year-to-year changes in market conditions. 
 
NYSE vs. other markets  
 
The final question we examine for US REITs is the relative liquidity of different 
markets. As mentioned above, we would have liked to distinguish between the   14
NASDAQ and other markets. However, we had only 8 stocks quoted on the 
NASDAQ so instead we divided our sample into NYSE and all other markets and 
estimated equation (4) for both sub-samples. The estimates conform closely to our 
expectations (see Table 5). NYSE REITs appear to have lower effective spreads 
and greater liquidity throughout the period.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
As mentioned above, we note that large cap REITs would be expected to be more 
liquid than small cap REITs – see Brounen et al. (2007) for research on the effects 
of firm size and different markets – and that this effect might confound the market 
effect. In order to investigate this issue, for the years 2001 to 2005
9, we regress (1) 
the estimated market depth parameter (λ, the sum of the absolute slopes) and (2) 
the estimated effective spread (α, the sum of the absolute intercepts), against a 
market dummy (NYSE=1), firm size (represented by the log of total assets), and 
the interaction between market and size as follows: 
 
η β β β β λ + + + + = ] * [ 3 2 1 size DNYSE size DNYSE o   (7a) 
η β β β β α + + + + = ] * [ 3 2 1 size DNYSE size DNYSE o   (7b) 
 
The results from this estimation are presented in Table 6. Turning first to the 
regression of market depth (equation 7a), we note that in every year (apart from 
2003) NYSE stocks were more liquid than non-NYSE stocks and large stocks were 
more liquid than small stocks. However the effect of size was not relevant for 
NYSE stocks because there was no significant difference between the coefficient 
β3 and the absolute value of the coefficient β2
10
 . In other words, we find that once a 
REIT is listed on the NYSE, the size of the firm does not matter because the 
market will guarantee  the existence of analysts looking at that company and hence 
                                                 
9 There were insufficient observations of the non-NYSE REITs before 2001 to include earlier years. 
10 We performed the Wald test and in none of the reported regressions was the difference 
significant at the 10% level.   15
its liquidity. This result has also a wider implication for other international markets. 
If we consider the European example, we may find that (especially small) real 
estate vehicles in countries with small stock exchanges may decide to list in 
markets with a better market coverage by analysts (e.g. London, Frankfurt, and 
Paris). Consequently, in the medium to long term we might speculate on whether a 
concentration of stocks would trade in the main markets, with less trading in 
smaller local markets. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
The effective spread regressions (equation 7b) provide a similar picture. Trading 
costs are lower for NYSE stocks and for large companies. However, as for market 
depth, we find that once a REIT is listed on the NYSE, the size of the firm does not 
matter. More specifically, according to the Wald test, there is no significant 
difference between the coefficient β3 and the absolute value of the coefficient β2 
(i.e. REITs traded on the NYSE do not benefit from being large). 
 
To summarize the results of our US analysis, we have shown that the use of 
aggregate daily data produces results for the 1993 to 2005 period that are 
consistent with earlier results based on trade-by-trade data. Furthermore, we have 
distinguished between the effects of market and size factors on liquidity, as well as 
the declining degree of asymmetry in market depth. 
 
Having demonstrated the robustness of the use of aggregate daily data, we now 
apply it to two other markets; the UK and Australia. The UK was chosen because it 
has had a significant sector of quoted real estate securities for a long time period. 
The Australian market was selected because it was the second country (after the 
US) to introduce tax-transparent real estate vehicles. We first present the UK 
results. 
 
   16
 
7. Application of Model to UK Property Companies 
 
To show the robustness of our liquidity estimation technique, we collected 
aggregate daily data from the UK market for the 37 major property companies 
composing the FTSE 350 real estate sector index. From Thomson DataStream we 
were able to obtain stock prices, daily trading volumes (i.e. sum of the value of 
transactions taking place on any day) and bid and ask prices at the end of each 
day. Note that the values are designated in British Sterling so are not directly 
comparable with the US figures. Our sample starts in the early 1990s just after a 
period in which real estate had suffered significant losses. The market had 
recovered by 1993 and subsequently reflected the general cyclical changes in the 
equity market until the late 1990s. The later period witnessed some shrinkage of 
the real estate sector as several companies were subject to private equity or 
management buy-outs. A significant difference in price changes could be observed 
from 2003 onwards as property companies started to become more attractive than 
other equities (the index increased from a value of 150 at the end of 2002 to a 
value of 350 at the end of 2005). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
Figure 5 displays average annual spreads for the UK market. Note that there is 
movement in reported spreads common to both the UK and the US in the early 
1990s; spreads fell in the UK market from a high in 1992 to 1994 where they 
remained with only minor changes for the rest of the period.  
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE ] 
 
Table 7 presents the results from estimating equation (4) on the property 
companies in the sector for each year in the sample. We observe slightly 
decreasing intercept dummies, reflecting decreasing effective spreads from 1993   17
through 2005. The steepness of the slopes (market depth) shows a substantial 
change between 1993 and 1994 but no clear trend through the rest of the period, 
although there is a much greater variability than observed for US REITs.  
 
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE ] 
 
 
8. Application of Model to Australian LPTs 
 
Australian Listed Property Trusts were established in 1971 and now account for 
more than 10% of the capitalization of the Australian stock market. In recent years, 
they have experienced both expansion and a wave of mergers and takeovers but 
their aggregate performance has been better than that recorded by the overall 
market. In the five year period ending 2005, the sector achieved more than twice 
the total return of the rest of the market.  Figure 6 presents the performance of 
LPTs over the 1992 – 2005 sample period. 
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE ] 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4) for the Australian 
market. The companies are chosen from the constituents of the Dow-Jones 
Australian LPT index. Because of mergers and expansions, the number of 
companies used in the regression fluctuates over the period from a low of 14 in 
1993 to a high of 45 in 2000. Data were collected from Thomson Datastream and 
trading values are designated in Australian $. 
 
The results of the regressions are consistent with those of the UK. There is less 
evidence of a sharp increase in liquidity at the start of the period and there is no 
obvious asymmetry in the market effective spreads. The effective spreads showed 
a tendency to decline only after 1999. There is a persistent asymmetry in the 
market depth for upward and downward price movements, except in 2002 and   18
2004 (echoing the results of the US) when liquidity was high and the asymmetry 
seemed less pronounced.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
 
9. Comparison of Reported Spreads and Estimated Effective Spreads. 
 
The results of the analysis using aggregate daily data in the US were shown to be 
consistent with previous research using trade-by-trade data. Although the 
regression results reveal changes in the UK and Australian markets, there might 
appear to be little evidence that the results reflect what had been observed or 
reported in the two markets. Mindful of this issue, we wanted to compare the 
estimates from the regressions with publicly available data and the obvious source 
was reported bid-ask spreads. As mentioned in the data sourcing, we had collected 
closing bid-ask spreads for a sample of US REITs and we also collected closing 
bid-ask spreads for the UK and Australian markets.  
 
There is some difficulty with collecting bid-ask spreads because where recorded, 
they are often taken at the close of trading and may be very noisy equivalents of 
typical spreads throughout the day. Accordingly we averaged the reported bid-ask 
spreads for each company-year in order to compare them with the effective 
spreads estimated in equation (4). We then regressed the effective spread against 
the reported spread and the results are shown in Table 9. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
As can be seen, the results are significant – effective spreads estimated from 
aggregate daily returns are positively related to reported spreads. The weakest 
relationship is between the US reported spreads and our estimates. This results 
from two different factors. First, the US market is more liquid than other markets   19
and therefore the effective spread might be less than the reported spread with 
more transactions taking place within the spread during the day. Second, the 
sample of REITs for which we were able to collect spreads was smaller than the 
sample used in the main regression analysis.   
 
The Australian market had the strongest relationship between the two spreads 
(with an adjusted R-squared of over 90%) but the effective spread actually was 
greater than the reported spread. This may suggest that the market depth for 
Australian LPTs is thinner than the market depth for US REITs and UK property 
companies. Nevertheless, it would appear that the daily return model is capturing 
information that is to some extent reflected in transaction-level data as well as 





Data availability inhibits research on international market microstructure. However, 
in this paper we develop a simple technique of estimating liquidity using aggregate 
daily stock price returns that appears to be consistent with the results of previous 
research obtained using intra-day data. Although we do not argue that our 
technique is superior to the use of intra-day data, our results are consistent with 
those of previous research. Moreover, our findings shed light upon the behavior of 
market liquidity or market depth over the relatively long period since 1993. 
 
More specifically we show that liquidity improved dramatically from 1993 to 1994 in 
the US REIT sector. As previous researchers have suggested, the improvements 
resulted largely from the introduction of new REITs. The degree of liquidity is 
related to both the size of REITs and the market in which their stocks are traded. 
The NYSE appeared to offer more liquidity than might have been expected; even 
after controlling for the size of companies traded on the NYSE.  
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As stock markets around the world introduce REIT-like vehicles, it is important to 
track the liquidity of the new vehicles. The results presented in this paper suggest 
that daily returns can be utilized to replicate the results of more detailed studies of 
trade-by-trade data. We do not claim to offer superior insights into the liquidity of 
developing markets. However, we conclude that daily data (which is more 
accessible and manageable than trade-by-trade data) can be used to reveal 
dynamic changes in market microstructure over a wider range of markets than 
have so far been studied.  21
References 
Acharya V. and Pedersen L. (2005): “Asset pricing with liquidity risk”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 77 No. 2, pp. 375-410. 
Amihud Y. (2002): “Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series 
effects”, Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 5, pp. 31-56. 
Bessembinder H. and Kaufman H. M. (1997): “A comparison of trade execution 
costs for NYSE and NASDAQ-listed stocks”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, Vol. 32, pp. 387-407. 
Boothe P. (1988), “Exchange Rate Risk and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Seven Country 
Comparison”, Economic Inquiry, 26, pp. 485-492. 
Brennan M.J. and Subrahmanyam A. (1996): “Investment Analysis and Price 
Formation in Securities Markets”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 38, pp. 361-
381. 
Brounen D., Eichholtz P. and Ling D.C. (2007): “The Liquidity of Property Shares: 
An International Comparison”, Real Estate Economics, forthcoming. 
Capozza D.R., Hendershott P.H. and Mack C. (2004): “An Anatomy of Price 
Dynamics in Illiquid Markets: Analysis and Evidence from Local Housing Markets”, 
Real Estate Economics, Vol. 32 No. 1, pp. 1-32. 
Chalmers J. and Kadlec G. (1998): “An empirical examination of the amortized 
spread”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 48, pp. 159-188. 
Chan K.C. and Lakonishok J. (1997): “Institutional Equity Trading Costs: NYSE 
Versus NASDAQ”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 713-735. 
Chordia T., Roll R. and Subrahmanyam A. (2000): “Commonality in liquidity”, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 56, pp. 3-28. 
Chordia T., Roll R. and Subrahmanyam A. (2001): “Market liquidity and trading 
activity”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56 No. 2, pp. 501-530. 
Chung K.H., Van Ness B.F. and Van Ness R.A. (1999) Limit orders and the bid–
ask spread. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 53, pp. 255–287 
Clayton J. and MacKinnon G. (2000): “Measuring and Explaining Changes in REIT 
Liquidity: Moving Beyond the Bid-Ask Spread”, Real Estate Economics, Vol. 28 No. 
1, pp. 89-115. 
Clark P.K. (1973): “A Subordinate Stochastic Process Model with Finite Variance 
for Speculative Prices”, Econometrica, 41, pp.135-155 
Cole R. (1998): “Changes in REIT Liquidity 1990-94: The Role of New REITs”, 
Paper presented at the 1998 AREUEA meeting, Chicago. 
Escribano, A. and Pascual, R., (2005) ”Asymmetries in bid and ask responses to 
innovations in the trading process”. Empirical Economics, November, 30, 4, 
pp. 913-946,   22
Glosten L.R. and Harris L.E. (1998): “Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask 
Spread”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 21, pp. 123-142. 
Gwilym O., Clare A. and Thomas S. (1998): “Price Clustering and Bid-Ask Spreads 
in International Bond Futures”, International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money, Vol. 8, pp. 37-391. 
Holthausen R.W., Leftwich R.W. and Mayers D.: (1987): “The Effect of Large Block 
Transactions on Security Prices: A Cross-Sectional Analysis”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 237-267. 
Huang R.D. and Stoll H.R. (1996): “Dealer Versus Auction Markets: A Paired 
Comparison of Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 313-357. 
Karpoff J.M. (1987): “The Relation Between Price Changes and Trading Volume: A 
Survey”,Journal of Financial And Quantitative Analysis, 22, pp109-126. 
Kluger B.D. and Miller N.G. (1990). “Measuring real estate liquidity”, AREUEA 
Journal, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 145-159. 
Kyle A. (1985): “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading”, Econometrica, Vol. 53, 
pp. 1315-1335. 
Lin J.C., Sanger G.C., and Booth G.G. (1995): “Trade Size and Components of the 
Bid-Ask Spread”, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 1153-1183. 
Madhaven A. and Sofianos G.(1998), “An empirical analysis of NYSE specialist 
trading”, Journal of Financial Economics, 48, pp. 189-210 
Nelling E., Mahoney J., Hildebrand T. and Goldstein M. (1995): “Real Estate 
Investment Trusts, Small Stocks and Bid-Ask Spreads”, Real Estate Economics, 
Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 45-63. 
Rogers L.C.G., Satchell S.E and Yoon Y. (2001), “Are stock prices driven by the 
volume of trade? Empirical Analysis of the FT30, FT100 and certain British shares 
over 1988-1990” in Knight J and Satchell S.E (eds) Return Distributions in Finance, 
Butterworth, Heinemann Oxford, pp. 118-141. 
Tauchen G.E. and Pitts M. (1979):  “The Price Variability-Volume Relationship on 
Speculative Markets”, Econometrica, 51, pp. 485-505.   23
Appendix 1: Figures 
 
Figure 1: Hypothetical Relationship between Trading Volume and Returns 
Volume 
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Source: SNL Financials. Total return indices for US S&P 500 and SNL Equity REITs, rebased to 
100 in December 1992 
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Source: Thomson Datastream. Yearly average of closing reported bid-ask spreads for a sample of 
25 US REITs. Spreads are computed for each company as follows: 
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where PAi,t and PBi,t respectively represent the bid and ask prices of company i at time t.   26
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Source: Thomson Datastream. Total return indices for UK FTSE All Share and FTSE 350 Real 
Estate Sector, rebased to 100 for December 1992. 
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Source: Thomson Datastream. Yearly average of closing reported bid-ask spreads for a sample of 
25 UK property companies. Spreads are computed for each company as follows: 
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= , where PAi,t and PBi,t respectively represent the bid and ask prices of 
company i at time t. 
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Figure 6: Performance of Thomson Datastream Australian All Share and Thomson 

































































































Source: Thomson Datastream. Total return indices for Australian Datastream All Share and Listed 
Property Trusts, rebased to 100 for December 1992.   29
Appendix 2: Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of daily returns and volumes for US REITs (1993-
2005) 
 
183 281,158 230,464 0.22% 0.00% 2005
174 266,995 225,361 0.33% 0.10% 2004
154 254,117 185,007 0.09% 0.11% 2003
143 233,229 164,381 0.12% 0.00% 2002
135 204,805 137,099 0.11% 0.04% 2001
134 128,090 101,340 0.10% 0.03% 2000
134 123,243 96,745 0.09% -0.07% 1999
130 110,565 89,723 0.18% -0.07% 1998
122 90,085 80,617 0.20% 0.04% 1997
106 68,465 58,820 0.13% 0.06% 1996
100 82,480 46,070 0.18% 0.03% 1995
95 44,968 41,562 0.11% -0.03% 1994
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Source: SNL Financials. Yearly average of daily returns and aggregate daily volumes of each trust 
in the US REIT sample. The cross-sectional standard deviation is calculated as the standard 
deviation of average daily returns of each REIT for each year. 
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Table 2: Means of parameter estimates for regressions in US (1993-2005) 
179 0.61 -0.007 0.007 0.000 -0.009 0.010 0.000 2005
166 0.62 -0.039 0.007 0.000 -0.012 0.013 0.000 2004
150 0.61 -0.014 0.018 0.000 -0.011 0.012 0.000 2003
139 0.59 -0.024 0.006 0.000 -0.014 0.015 0.000 2002
132 0.59 -0.016 0.019 0.000 -0.015 0.014 0.000 2001
131 0.65 -0.031 0.034 0.000 -0.015 0.015 0.000 2000
130 0.65 -0.019 0.040 0.000 -0.014 0.014 0.000 1999
125 0.59 -0.008 0.025 0.000 -0.016 0.016 0.000 1998
114 0.67 -0.006 0.027 0.000 -0.017 0.017 0.000 1997
101 0.72 -0.005 0.015 0.000 -0.017 0.017 0.000 1996
98 0.74 -0.034 0.052 0.000 -0.022 0.022 0.000 1995
92 0.72 -0.019 0.027 0.000 -0.026 0.027 0.000 1994
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1 0 2 1 0 ε λ λ λ α α α
  
The table reports the yearly average estimates of the regressions of equation (4) represented 
above. In each year 1993-2005 the daily price change of each US REIT is regressed against a 
constant (α0), two dummy variables representing days with respectively positive (α1) and negative 
(α2) price change (we assume the former to refer to days where the aggregate daily trading 
volumes initiated by buyer exceed the ones initiated by sellers), aggregate daily trading volumes 
(λ0) and an interaction between each of the two dummy variables and trading volumes (respectively  
(λ1, λ2). The α and λ parameters respectively represent the average of the estimated effective bid-
ask spreads and the average of the estimated market depth coefficients. The averages reported 
were for the number of regressions reported each year. Source of data: SNL Financials. 
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Table 3: Proportion of parameter estimates significant at the 5% level in the 
regression reported in Table 2. 
30.7% 30.7% 3.9% 1.7% 2005
27.7% 28.3% 6.6% 3.6% 2004
34.0% 34.7% 8.0% 8.7% 2003
28.5% 35.0% 5.8% 2.2% 2002
42.3% 49.2% 10.8% 6.9% 2001
77.9% 79.4% 17.6% 16.0% 2000
83.7% 77.5% 13.2% 27.1% 1999
78.4% 68.8% 7.2% 15.2% 1998
94.7% 93.8% 15.9% 18.6% 1997
100.0% 100.0% 14.1% 28.3% 1996
99.0% 99.0% 20.4% 33.7% 1995
100.0% 100.0% 21.1% 24.4% 1994
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The table summarizes the proportion of significant α and λ parameter estimates for the regressions 
of daily returns against trading volumes for each US REIT reported in Table 2. Source of data: SNL 
Financials. 
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Table 4: Differences in the means of the parameter estimates for new US REITs 
against old REITs (1993-2005) 
 
129 0.014 -0.009 0.004 -0.003 2005
116 0.010 -0.011 0.001 -0.002 2004
100 0.016 -0.011 0.002 -0.002 2003
90 0.016 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 2002
82 0.012 -0.033 0.007 -0.007 2001
82 0.050 -0.051 0.006 -0.006 2000
81 0.009 -0.011 0.001 0.000 1999
76 0.004 -0.031 0.003 0.000 1998
64 0.007 -0.011 0.003 -0.002 1997
51 0.017 -0.011 0.005 -0.005 1996
48 0.063 -0.081 0.006 -0.006 1995
41 0.039 -0.053 0.002 -0.002 1994












129 0.014 -0.009 0.004 -0.003 2005
116 0.010 -0.011 0.001 -0.002 2004
100 0.016 -0.011 0.002 -0.002 2003
90 0.016 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 2002
82 0.012 -0.033 0.007 -0.007 2001
82 0.050 -0.051 0.006 -0.006 2000
81 0.009 -0.011 0.001 0.000 1999
76 0.004 -0.031 0.003 0.000 1998
64 0.007 -0.011 0.003 -0.002 1997
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Note: There were 50 old REITs used in the sample for comparative purposes. 
The table is constructed by running the regressions of equation (4) for (a) old REITs and (b) new 
REITs and reporting the average difference between the estimated coefficients for the α and λ 
terms. There are 13 sets of results; 11 of the positive estimated α intercepts (average of the 
estimated effective bid-ask spreads) are of the correct sign, whilst all of the negative estimated α 
intercepts are of the correct sign. All the λ coefficients (average of the estimated market depth 
coefficients) are also of the correct sign. If there were no systematic difference between the new 
and the old REITs, the probability of observing 2 or less contrary observations from a sample size of 
13 would be 1.1% so the results reported in the table would seem very robust. Regressions were 
run on daily returns against trading volumes for each US REIT in each year 1993-2005. The 
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Table 5: Differences in the means of the parameter estimates for NYSE REITs 

















52 0.016 -0.015 0.009 -0.008 2005
50 0.032 -0.030 0.008 -0.006 2004
47 0.031 -0.039 0.009 -0.008 2003
40 0.035 -0.034 0.014 -0.014 2002
36 0.007 -0.047 0.017 -0.016 2001
35 0.034 -0.051 0.017 -0.015 2000
35 0.021 -0.021 0.008 -0.011 1999
31 0.034 -0.062 0.018 -0.020 1998
26 0.009 -0.009 0.018 -0.016 1997
20 0.045 -0.015 0.019 -0.017 1996
20 0.055 -0.097 0.017 -0.020 1995
18 0.112 -0.017 0.014 -0.016 1994
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Note: (Parameter estimates for NYSE – parameter estimates for other markets) 
The table is constructed by running the regressions of equation (4) for (a) NYSE REITs and (b) non-
NYSE REITs and reporting the average difference between the estimated coefficients for the α and 
λ terms. As in the preceding table, the differences between the parameter estimates for the NYSE 
and non-NYSE markets are all in the expected direction. The results would seem to be robust to the 
conclusion that NYSE offers more liquidity than the other markets. 
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Table 6: Regression of Market Depth (Panel A) and Effective Spreads (Panel B) 
against Market Dummy, (Log-)Size and the interaction between Size and Market. 
 
Panel B: Effective Spreads (α) Panel A: Market Depth (λ)
*  Significant  at  90%  confidence  level
**  Significant  at  95%  confidence  level
***  Significant  at  99%  confidence  level
4.15 -7.03 -4.22 8.37 2.95 -4.45 -3.10 5.04 t-stat
4.53 -8.29 -4.46 9.48 3.24 -4.94 -3.33 5.47 t-stat
24.18 0.009*** -0.011*** -0.13*** 0.171*** 11.27 0.069*** -0.074*** -0.982*** 1.057*** 2004
28.79 0.012*** -0.015*** -0.157*** 0.214*** 11.91 0.061*** -0.064*** -0.865*** 0.911*** 2005
3.55 -5.13 -3.72 5.99 3.15 -5.29 -3.23 5.95 t-stat


























3.93 -6.82 -3.93 7.93 t-stat
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For each year, the averages of the estimated λ (Panel A) and α (Panel B) coefficients across the 
REITs are regressed against a dummy variable to distinguish between stock exchange (DNYSE 
being equal to 1 if the market is NYSE, 0 otherwise), market capitalization (size) and an interaction 
term (DNYSE * size).   35
Table 7: Means of parameter estimates for regressions in UK (1993-2005) 
39 0.57 -0.011 0.037 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 2005
35 0.57 -0.036 0.034 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 2004
32 0.55 -0.029 0.055 0.000 -0.010 0.011 0.000 2003
32 0.54 -0.013 0.032 0.000 -0.011 0.011 0.000 2002
32 0.53 -0.030 0.052 0.000 -0.010 0.008 0.000 2001
26 0.53 -0.023 0.015 0.000 -0.008 0.009 0.000 2000
25 0.56 -0.047 0.095 0.000 -0.009 0.011 0.000 1999
25 0.57 -0.041 0.016 0.000 -0.009 0.009 0.000 1998
20 0.56 -0.041 0.075 0.000 -0.011 0.013 0.000 1997
18 0.70 -0.015 0.044 0.000 -0.009 0.010 0.000 1996
20 0.72 -0.048 0.050 0.000 -0.011 0.012 0.000 1995
19 0.67 -0.021 0.048 0.000 -0.011 0.012 0.000 1994
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Data source: Thomson Datastream. The table reports the yearly average estimates of the 
regressions of equation (4) represented above. In each year 1993-2005 the price change of each 
UK property company is regressed against a constant (α0), two dummy variables representing days 
with respectively positive (α1) and negative (α2) price change (we assume the former to refer to 
days where the aggregate daily trading volumes initiated by buyer exceed the ones initiated by 
sellers), aggregate daily trading volumes (λ0) and an interaction between each of the two dummy 
variables and trading volumes (respectively (λ1, λ2). The α and λ parameters respectively represent 
the average of the estimated effective bid-ask spreads and the average of the estimated market 
depth coefficients. The averages reported were for the number of regressions reported each year.  
Source of data:  Thomson Datastream.   36
Table 8: Means of parameter estimates for regressions in Australia (1993-2005) 
21 0.63 -0.010 0.013 0.000 -0.009 0.009 0.000 2005
28 0.73 -0.013 0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.009 0.000 2004
34 0.71 -0.012 0.016 0.000 -0.010 0.010 0.000 2003
35 0.74 -0.013 0.007 0.000 -0.010 0.010 0.000 2002
42 0.69 -0.012 0.017 0.000 -0.012 0.012 0.000 2001
45 0.71 -0.011 0.023 0.000 -0.014 0.014 0.000 2000
42 0.71 -0.014 0.022 0.000 -0.014 0.015 0.000 1999
37 0.69 -0.004 0.020 0.000 -0.013 0.013 0.000 1998
33 0.67 -0.007 0.021 0.000 -0.012 0.012 0.000 1997
27 0.73 -0.001 0.025 0.000 -0.011 0.010 0.000 1996
22 0.76 0.000 0.036 0.000 -0.008 0.008 0.000 1995
21 0.72 -0.004 0.027 0.000 -0.014 0.013 0.000 1994
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Data source: Thomson Datastream. The table reports the yearly average estimates of the 
regressions of equation (4) represented above. In each year 1993-2005 the daily price change of 
each Australian LPT is regressed against a constant (α0), two dummy variables representing days 
with respectively positive (α1) and negative (α2) price change (we assume the former to refer to 
days where the aggregate daily trading volumes initiated by buyer exceed the ones initiated by 
sellers), aggregate daily trading volumes (λ0) and an interaction between each of the two dummy 
variables and trading volumes (respectively (λ1, λ2). The α and λ parameters respectively represent 
the average of the estimated effective bid-ask spreads and the average of the estimated market 
depth coefficients. The averages reported were for the number of regressions reported each year.  
Source of data:  Thomson Datastream. 
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Table 9: Regression of reported spreads on effective spreads 
 




1.46 0.01 Australian LPTs
0.68 651.99
0.68 0.01 UK Property Companies
2.67 2.81 t-stat
0.44 7.12
0.60 0.02 US REITs
Adjusted
R
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0.68 651.99
0.68 0.01 UK Property Companies
2.67 2.81 t-stat
0.44 7.12
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2 F-statistic γ µ Market
Regression tests Coefficients
 
The table reports the estimates of the regression of the absolute sum of effective bid-ask spreads – 
sum of α1 and α2 coefficients in equation (4) – for each company/trust in each year 1993-2005, 
against the average spreads reported by Thomson Datastream / Reuters. If effective spreads 
represent a good estimate of reported spreads, we expect the intercept (µ) to be equal to 0 and the 
slope of the linear relationship (γ) to be equal to 1. 